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CHILDHOOD'S END: WRONGFUL DEATH OF A FETUS
The plaintiffs (husband and wife) sued to recover damages for in-
juries sustained in an automobile accident caused by the defendants.
The appellate court affirmed the trial court's award, which included
$10,000 in damages to each parent for the loss of their six-month old
fetus, born dead ten days after the accident. On rehearing, the Loui-
siana Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts' rulings and held that
parents may recover damages for the wrongful death of a six-month
old fetus. Danos v. St. Pierre, 402 So. 2d 633 (La. 1981).
Absent specific statutory provisions,' civil liability at common law
for prenatal injuries has been predicated upon the existence of legal
personality.2 Prior to 1946 the common law did not recognize a cause
of action for prenatal injuries, primarily because of the precedent
established by the Massachusetts Supreme Court in Dietrich v. In-
habitants of Northhampton.3 The Dietrich court held that an unborn
child unable to survive a premature birth has no separate existence
from its mother; a fetus therefore cannot be considered a "person
recognized by the law or capable of having a locus standi in court,
or of being represented there by an administrator."' Another early
case, Allair v. St. Luke's Hospital,5 relied on Dietrich to hold that
because an unborn child cannot be considered a "person" to whom
a duty is owed separate from the duty owed its mother, the child,
though born alive, cannot recover for its prenatal injuries. Later courts
also relied on Dietrich and Allair as authority' but added to the
reasons for denying recovery the possibility of a flood of fictitious
claims and the difficulties in proving a causal connection between the
injury and the malformation or death
Although criticism of the Dietrich-Allair rationale that an unborn
child is part of its mother began immediately,8 express judicial repudia-
1. See, e.g.. CAL. CIv. CODE S 29 (West 1954); TENN. CODE ANN. S 20-5-106 (1980
replacement).
2. See Gordon, The Unborn Plaintiff, 63 MICH. L. REv. 579 (1965); Kader, The Law
of Tortious Prenatal Death Since Roe v. Wade, 45 Mo. L. REV. 639 (1980); Note Tort
Recovery for the Unborn Child, 15 J. FAM. L. 276 (1977).
3. 138 Mass. 14, 52 Am. Rep. 242 (1884). The case involved a wrongful death
suit by a four and one-half months pregnant woman whose fall on a negligently main-
tained highway caused the premature birth and death of her child, who allegedly sur-
vived outside the womb for ten or fifteen minutes.
4. 138 Mass. at 16, 52 Am. Rep. at 244.
5. 184 Ill. 359, 56 N.E. 638 (1900). The case involved a suit for damages for a
child injured only four days before its normal term birth.
6. See, e.g.. Standford v. St. Louis-San Francisco R.R. Co., 214 Ala. 611, 108 So.
566 (1926): Drobner v. Peters, 232 N.Y. 220, 133 N.E. 567 (1921); Magnolia Coca-Cola
Bottling Co. v. Jordan, 124 Tex. 347, 78 S.W.2d 944 (1935).
7. Magnolia Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Jordan, 124 Tex. 347, 78 S.W.2d 944 (1935).
8. Dissenting in Allair, Justice Boggs sought to distinguish Allair from Dietrich
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tion was not forthcoming for nearly half a century.' All American
jurisdictions now recognize a cause of action for prenatal injuries to
a child subsequently born alive,1 but many courts1 limit recovery to
injuries sustained after viability, that point in fetal development at
which the fetus can exist independently from its mother.12 The viability
requirement has been criticized as arbitrary" and, in light of modern
medical science, unjustified.' In fact, several jurisdictions have re-
jected the requirement altogether. 5
The major area of controversy in the field of tortious prenatal
injuries at present is recovery for the wrongful death of a stillborn,"
and, specifically, whether a fetus can be considered a "person"" within
on the basis of the unborn's viability:
If at that period [viability] a child so advanced is injured in its limbs or members
and is born into the living world suffering from the effects of this injury, is it
not sacrificing truth to a mere theoretical abstraction to say the injury was not
to the child but wholly to its mother?
184 III. at 370, 56 N.E. at 641 (Boggs, J. dissenting). Consequently, Justice Boggs would
have held a viable child to be a "person" distinct from its mother to the extent that
if born alive it could maintain an action in tort for its prenatal injuries.
9. Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946), was the first case to recognize
a common law cause of action for prenatal injuries to a viable child subsequently born
alive. The court distinguished Dietrich on its facts and sub silentio adopted Justice
'Boggs' dissenting opinion in Allair. Thus began what the late Dean Prosser described
.as "the most spectacular abrupt reversal of a well settled rule in the whole history
of the law of torts." W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS S 55, at 336 (4th ed. 1971).
10. The last obstacle to recovery was removed by Alabama in Huskey v. Smith,
289 Ala. 52, 265 So. 2d 596 (1972), overruling Stanford v. St. Louis-San Francisco R.R.
Co., 214 Ala. 611, 108 So. 566 (1926). See Kader. supra note 2, at 642.
11. E.g., Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946); Hale v. Manion, 189
Kan. 143, 368 P.2d 1 (1962); Rainey v. Horn, 221 Miss. 269, 72 So. 2d 434 (1954); Stidam
v. Ashmore, 109 Ohio App. 431, 167 N.E.2d 106 (1959).
12. STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1388 (22d ed. 1972).
13. See generally Note, supra note 2.
14. See Kader, supra note 2, at 658-59 (in the context of wrongful death of a
stillborn); Note, The Impact of Medical Knowledge on the Law Relating to Prenatal In-
juries, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 554 (1962).
15. E.g. Wolfe v. Isbell, 291 Ala. 327, 280 So. 2d 758 (1973); Porter v. Lassiter,
91 Ga. App. 712, 89 S.E.2d 100 (1958); Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 157 A.2d 497
(1960). See also Note, supra note 2, at 280-81 n.21.
16. Kader, supra note 2, at 642.
17. One writer has argued that the characterization of the unborn as a "person"
in prenatal injury cases where the child survives is unnecessary for imposing liability.
Rather, the courts should recognize a "legally protected interest in beginning life with
a healthy body." Note, Torts-Prenatal Injuries-Characterization of Unborn Child as
a "Person" Immaterial to Recovery, 20 LA. L. REv. 810, 810 (1960). Effectively this is
true. The American common law rule, however, is that a child en ventra sa mere (in
the womb) is considered as born alive for all purposes to his benefit, but not so con-
sidered if to his detriment. For a thorough discussion of the common law rule see
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the meaning of the wrongful death statutes." Twenty-eight jurisdic-
tions now allow recovery for the wrongful death of a fetus;" and all
of them, either by recognizing the biological independence of the fetus"'
Note, The Law and the Unborn Child: The Legal and Logical Inconsistencies, 46 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 349 (1971). Birth and viability, then, act as a kind of suspensive condition,
or condition precedent, to legal personality. See Endresz v. Friedberg, 24 N.Y.2d 478,
301 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1969). The effect is that once the child is born, all rights relative
to or dependent on the child's personality relate back to the time spent in the womb.
A similar rule exists in civil law jurisdictions, including Louisiana. See note 37, infra.
The presumption behind the rule is that legal personality begins only at birth.
Nonetheless, most wrongful death statutes employ the term "person," and courts have
been compelled, understandably, to determine whether the statutes include the death
of a fetus. Thus, in most instances, characterization of the unborn as a "person" is
necessary for imposing liability for an unborn's wrongful death.
18. All American wrongful death statutes, in whatever form they appear, can be
traced to England's FATAL ACCIDENTS ACT. 9 and 10 Vict., c. 93 (1846). But there is con-
siderable confusion among the various jurisdictions-over the precise nature of the
remedy and what damages are recoverable-the victim's or the survivors', pecuniary
or non-pecuniary. A detailed discussion of the differences in the various wrongful death
statutes is beyond the scope of this casenote. For a general discussion see S. SPEISER.
RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH SS 14:1-3 (1966).
19. See, e.g., Simmons v. Howard Univ., 323 F. Supp. 529 (D.D.C. 1971); Eich v.
Town of Gulf Shores, 293 Ala. 95, 300 So. 2d 354 (1974); Gorke v. LeClerc, 23 Conn.
Supp. 256; 181 A.2d 448 (Super. Ct. 1962); Worgan v. Greggs & Ferrara, Inc., 50 Del.
258, 128 A.2d 557 (1956); Porter v. Lassiter, 91 Ga. App. 712, 87 S.E.2d 100 (1955);
Chrisafogeorgis v. Brandenburg, 55 11. 2d 368, 304 N.E.2d 88 (1973); Britt v. Sears,
150 Ind. App. 487, 277 N.E.2d 20 (1971); Hale v. Manion, 189 Kan. 143, 368 P.2d 1
(1962); Mitchell v. Couch, 285 S.W.2d 901 (Ky. 1955): Danos v. St. Pierre, 402 So. 2d
633 (La. 1981); State ex rel. Odham v. Sherman, 234 Md. 179, 198 A.2d 71 (1964); Mone
v. Greyhound Lines Inc., 331 N.E.2d 916 (1975); O'Neil v. Morse, 385 Mich. 130, 188
N.W.2d 785 (1971); Verkennes v. Corniea, 229 Minn. 365, 38 N.W.2d 838 (1949); Rainey
v. Horn, 221 Miss. 269, 72 So. 2d 434 (1954); White v. Yup, 85 Nev. 527, 458 P.2d
617 (1969); Poliquin v. MacDonald, 101 N.H. 104, 135 A.2d 249 (1957); Salazar v. St.
Vincent Hosp., 95 N.M. 150, 619 P.2d 826 (1980); Stidam v. Ashmore, 109 Ohio App.
431, 167 N.E.2d 106 (1959); Evans v. Olson, 550 P.2d 924 (Okla. 1976); Libbee v. Per-
manente Clinic, 268 Or. 258, 518 P.2d 636 (1974); Presley v. Newport Hosp. 365 A.2d
748 (R.I. 1976); Fowler v. Woodward, 244 S.C. 608, 138 S.E.2d 42 (1964); Moen v. Han-
son, 85 Wash. 2d 597, 537 P.2d 266 (1975); Baldwin v. Butcher, 155 W. Va. 431, 184
S.E.2d 428 (1971h Vaillancourt v. Medical Cts. Hosp. of Vt., 425 A.2d 92 (Vt. 1980);
Kwaterski v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 34 Wis. 2d 14, 148 N.W.2d 107 (1967);
TENN. CODE ANN. S 20-5-106 (1980 replacement).
20. This approach is of course a rejection of the Dietrich-Allair rationale criti-
cized by many jurisdictions in prenatal cases in which the child lives. Other jurisdic-
tions use a causative analysis, which focuses on the causal relation between the tor-
tious conduct and the injury and not on the issue of biological independence. See Note
supra note 2, at 280-82. However, those jurisdictions which deny wrongful death recovery
for unborn children employ the theory, at least implicitly, that tort recovery depends
on personality which in turn depends upon birth. See note 17, 8upra. See Gordon, supra
note 2. Those jurisdictions which allow wrongful death recovery, however, link per-
sonality not to birth but to biological independence. Consequently, liability is imposed
whether the fetus is born alive or dead.
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or by simply following the "great weight of authority,""1 have recog-
nized the essential personality of the unborn child. Arguments which
have been used to justify recovery are that such an action is a logical
corollary to the action allowed when the child lives," that the action
is consistent with the philosophy of the wrongful death statutes, 2 and
that a denial would reward the tortfeasor rather than deter the
wrongful act.2'
Eleven jurisdictions have refused to extend wrongful death
coverage to unborn children.25 Courts generally have justified this
denial by strictly construing the applicable statutes." However, some
courts have justified denial with such arguments that the action will
result in double recovery to the mother' and that proof of causation
and damage is inherently difficult. 8 Twelve jurisdictions have not con-
sidered the question squarely.2
21. E.g., Worgan v. Greggo & Ferrara, Inc., 50 Del. 258, 128 A.2d 557 (1956). The
"great weight" of modern authority began with Verkennes v. Corniea, 229 Minn. 365,
38 N.W. 838 (1949).
22. E.g., Eich v. Town of Gulf Shores, 293 Ala. 95, 99, 300 So. 2d 354, 357 (1974).
23. 293 Ala. at 98, 300 So. 2d at 356.
24. 293 Ala. at 98, 300 So. 2d at 356.
25. See, e.g., Kilmer v. Hicks, 22 Ariz. App. 552, 529 P.2d 706 (1974); Justus v.
Archison, 19 Cal. 3d 564, 139 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1977); Stern v. Miller, 348 So. 2d 303 (Fla.
1977); McKillip v. Zimmerman, 191 N.W.2d 706 (Iowa 1971); State ex rel. Hardin v.
Sanders, 538 S.W.2d 336 (Mo. 1976); Drabbels v. Skelly Oil Co., 158 Neb. 17, 50 N.W.2d
229 (1951); Graf v. Taggert, 43 N.J. 303, 204 A.2d 140 (1964); Endresz v. Friedberg,
24 N.Y.2d 478, 301 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1969); Gay v. Thompson, 226 N.C. 394, 146 S.E.2d
425 (1966); Marko v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 420 Pa. 124, 216 A.2d 502 (1966); Lawrence
v. Craven Line Co., 210 Va. 138, 169 S.E.2d 440 (1969).
26. "[W]e do not join those courts which have equated fetus with person simply
because the wrongful death statute is 'remedial' and must be 'liberally' construed."
Justin v. Atchison, 19 Cal. 3d 564, 575, 139 Cal. Rptr, 97, 107 (1977). Other statutory
arguments denying recovery specifically address the nature of the remedy. See S.
SPEISER. supra note 18, at S 14:1-3, at 743-50. See also Kader, supra note 2, at 647 n.40.
27. Endresz v. Friedberg, 24 N.Y.2d 478, 248 N.E.2d 901 (1969). The argument.
is that the mother is already compensated for the pain and suffering accompanying
her own injuries. Separate recovery in a wrongful death action would "double" her
recovery for those damages.
28. E.g., Graf v. Taggert, 43 N.J. 303, 204 A.2d 140 (1964). Such reasoning has
been criticized: As to causation, see Note, supra note 14, at 563; as to damages, see
Note, Prenatal Injuries and Wrongful Death, 18 VAND. L. REv. 847 (1965): "It is submit.-
ted that the measure of damages now applied universally in wrongful death cases
is inherently a determination involving considerable conjecture, and ... will produce
results no more speculative than those involving minor children." Id. at 855.
29. Those states that have not addressed the issue are Alaska, Arkansas, Col-
orado, Hawaii, Idaho, Maine, Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, Texas, Utah and
Wyoming. But see Mace v. Jung, 210 F. Supp. 706 (D. Alaska 1962) (federal court,
applying state law denied recovery for a nonviable fetus); see also Nelson v. Peterson,
542 P.2d 1075 (Utah 1975) where the court said, "[wlhether or not it [loss of a stillborn]
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NOTES
Louisiana's foray into the field of prenatal injuries began with
Cooper v. Blanck 0 In holding that a prenatally-injured, viable child
born alive may maintain an action for its injuries, the Orleans Court
of Appeals in Cooper broadly construed article 29 of the Louisiana
Civil Code, which provides in part "[c]hildren in the mother's womb
are considered, in whatever relates to themselves, as if they were
already born."'" Referring to the word "whatever," the court said this
"language used is of the most sweeping character." 2 Continuing, the
court declared in dicta that an action also would lie for the wrongful
death of a stillborn.' However, in Youman v. MeConnell & McCon-
nell, Inc." the Second Circuit Court of Appeals had occasion to inter-
pret the scope of article 28 of the Louisiana Civil Code, which declares
that "[clhildren born dead are considered as if they had never been
born or conceived. " " The court in Youman denied recovery for the
wrongful death of a stillborn and held that an unborn child is not
a legal person prior to birth 5
The construction of articles 28 and 29 in these two cases clearly
made birth the sine qua non of legal personality, and personality the
sin qua non of tort recovery for prenatal injuries. This construction
was in line not only with early common law rules but also with an
apparently general civil law principle. Nonetheless, confusion arose
among the Louisiana courts over the holdings in Cooper and Youman.
gives a different basis of recovery [from that of a miscarriage] can be determined
when liability has been found in a proper case." Id. at 1077-78.
30. 39 So. 2d 352 (Orl. App. 1923) (unreported until 1949). This case involved a
woman in, her eighth month of pregnancy whose unborn child was injured by falling
plaster from the ceiling of the mother's bedroom while the mother was sleeping. The
child died several days after is premature birth.
31. LA. CIv. CODE art. 29.
32. 39 So. 2d at "360.
33. "lAInd if the child be killed at this period, before its birth, we see no reason
why its parents cannot maintain an action for the death of their child." Id.
34. 7 La. App. 315 (2d Cir. 1927).
35. LA. CIv. CODE art. 28.
36. The civil law has always provided for the civil rights of the child en ventra
sa mere, and while such rights are considered as never having existed when the
child is born dead, because it is not regarded as a legal person until born alive,
we think the provision of the Code should be read in this light, that is, that the
child born dead is not considered as having had a legal personality distinct from
its mother.
7 La. App. at 317.
37. See notes 17 & 20, supra. Although France has no codal provision defining
personality, capacity to inherit property depends on birth and viability. See 1 M.
PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE, pt. 1, nos. 366-70 (11th ed. La. St. L. Inst. trans. 1959). Under
Spanish law, the child must be born in human form and live at least twenty-four hours
after separation from its mother before legal personality will relate back to the mo-
ment of conception. SPAN. CIv. CODE arts. 29 & 30 (5th ed. Fisher trans. 1947). See also
19821 1415
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In Johnson v. South New Orleans Light & Traction Co.,3" a compa-
nion case to Cooper, the Orleans circuit, without discussing articles
28 or 29, allowed recovery for the wrongful death of a stillborn child. 9
Valence v. Louisiana Power & Light Co."' also recognized a wrongful
death cause of action but only in dicta. However, Wascom v. American
Indemnity Corp.," a first circuit case, specifically relied on Youman
and article 28 to deny recovery fo- the loss of stillborn twins. Subse-
quently, in two cases decided the same day, the first circuit reversed
its decision in Wascom and allowed recovery for the wrongful death
of a stillborn." The third and fourth circuits quickly followed suit.'"
These decisions led the Louisiana Supreme Court to examine the rule
in Danos v. St. Pierre.
In the instant case, the parents sued for the wrongful death of
their six-month old stillborn fetus. The Louisiana Supreme Court ex-
pressly rejected the application of article 28, which considers unborn
children as never having existed. Declaring that the "Legislature had
no . . . intention in enacting [Civil Code article] 28"" to preclude
recovery for the wrongful death of a stillborn, the court based its
decision on a "logical resolution of a problem in which the Legislature
has not specifically expressed its intent to authorize or prohibit such
GER. Civ. CODE art. I (Forrester. Goren, Ilger trans. 1975); JAP. CIv. CODE art. 1 (Sebald
trans. 1934); Swiss. Civ. CODE art. 31 (Shick's trans. 1915). See generally Comment, Tort
Liability for Prenatal Injury. 24 TUL. L. REV. 435, 442 (1950) and the relevant sources
cited therein.
38. Orl. App. No. 9048 (1923) (an unreported case).
39. Neither Johnson nor Cooper were available to the second circuit when it decided
Youman, both being unreported at the time. However, the Cooper decision was handed
down on the same day as the Johnson decision on rehearing. The original hearing
in Johnson had been given some ten weeks before. Perhaps Cooper's reliance on arti-
cle 29 was intended to ameliorate the deficiency in Johnson of a proper codal analysis.
But this is only speculation. See Comment, Survival of Actions in Article 2315 of the
Louisiana Civil Code: The Victim's Action and the Wrongful Death Action, 43 TUL. L.
REV. 330, 338-39 (1969). for an in-depth discussion of Johnson.
40. 50 So. 2d 847 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1951). "We cannot be persuaded that, under
no circumstances, should there be awarded damages to the parents of the unborn child
if the fetus, while in its mother's womb, has been so injured that it cannot be born
alive." Id. at 849. The parents were unable to recover for lack of sufficient proof of
causation.
41. 348 So. 2d 128 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writs refused, 380 So. 2d 1224 (La. 1977).
42. See Danos v. St. Pierre, 383 So. 2d 1019 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writs granted,
384 So. 2d 985 (La. 1980); Diefenderfer v. Louisiana Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 383
So. 2d 1032 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writs granted, 384 So. 2d 985 (La. 1980).
43. Deason v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 386 So. 2d 146 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1980) (wrongful death recovery for an eight and one-half month old stillborn child);
Ezell v. Morrison, 380 So. 2d 664 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1980) (recovery for a four and
one-half month old stillborn child).
44. 402 So. 2d at 638.
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recovery."" The court then weighed certain "persuasive
considerations"'" favoring recovery against those factors militating
against recovery.
First, the court stated that "it would be totally illogical and
arbitrary"'7 to condition liability upon birth, and buttressed the argu-
ment with the "supportive hypothetical foil"" of prenatally injured
twins, one of whom survives for a few moments outside the womb.
To allow recovery for the survivor, but not for the stillborn, the court
said, would be an unjustified distinction. 9 Second, a denial of recovery
ironically would benefit the tortfeasor who would have to pay for his
maiming of the fetus, but who "would not have to pay any damages
if his fault cause[d] prenatal death."" Finally, the court referred to
a recent amendment to the Louisiana Criminal Code, which defines
a person as a human being from the moment of fertilization and
implantation,' as an indication of a "legislative favoring of applying
laws such as wrongful death articles to unborn children.""2
While acknowledging the difficulty of proving damages and causa-
tion and the possibility of fraudulent claims, the court nevertheless
described the arguments against recovery not only as "totally illogical,,
but also [as disregarding] the very essence of the judicial process."'
The court concluded that "the arguments favoring recovery more fully
satisfy the logical reasoning and application of the natural law"" and
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Kader, supra note 2, at 646.
49. 402 So. 2d at 638 n.6.
50. Id. at 638.
51. CRIMINAL CODE: LA. R.S. 14:2 (1950). as amended by 1976 La. Acts, No. 256, S 1.
But see State v. Brown, 378 So. 2d 916 (La. 1980) (the court held that the amendment
could not by implication make feticide a homicide).
52. 402 So. 2d at 638. This argument is deceptive. In 1976 Senate Bill 261, a com-
panion bill to Senate Bill 260 (which was later enacted as 1976 La. Acts, No. 256,
S1), proposed amending article 2315 to define "person" as including a human being
from the moment of conception. See OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE
SENATE OF THE STATE OF LOUISIANA, 2d Reg. Sess. at 74 (May 18, 1976). Similarly, in 1981
House Bill 686 was introduced to provide for the same amendment. See OFFICIAL JOUR-
NAL OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE STATE OF LOUISIANA.
7th Reg. Sess. at 192 (April 24, 1981). Neither bill was passed. It is, therefore, ques-
tionable whether the "legislative favoring" the court-refers to is properly supportive
of the argument. See Danos v. St. Pierre, 402 So. 2d 633, 639 (La. 1981) (Dixon, C.J.,
dissenting).
53. 402 So. 2d at 638.
54. Id. at 639. For those positivists who recoil in horror at the mention of 'natural
law.' see generally Stone, The So-Called Unprovided For Case, 53 TUL. L. REV. 93 (1978):
The phrase "natural law" was not defined in the code but derives from le droit
natural in Portails' projet and can perhaps best be understood in the context of
19821 1417
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held that because the Civil Code does not "expressly or impliedly'u
deny recovery, the plaintiffs have a cause of action for the loss of
their unborn child.
The result reached in the instant case is desirable in view of the
growing concern for the rights of the unborn" and in view of the
general policy of compensating victims for losses attributable to tor-
tious wrongs.' Moreover, the result accords with the trend of the
majority of American common law jurisdictions that have faced the
issue." Indeed, the court adopted from the common law all of the ma-
jor arguments favoring recovery. Nonetheless, the basis of the court's
decision is somewhat ambiguous and confusing. The precise nature
of the cause of action granted is unclear, as is the classification of
the loss of an unborn as the loss of a person, non-person, or thing.
The initial question is whether the recovery granted falls under
the first paragraph of article 2315,"* which contains Louisiana's general
statement of tort liability, or under the third paragraph of article 2315,
which contains Louisiana's wrongful death statute and which requires
the death of a "person."' Justice Lemmon, writing for the majority
on rehearing, framed the issue in terms of compensation for damages
sustained by a tortfeasor's "fault which causes [not only] the fatal in-
jury to the child [but] also causes the loss to the parents."' He
described the cause of action for the loss of the unborn child as one
for "damages which are clearly recoverable by the literal terms of
the fountainhead article of Louisiana tort law.""2 He then described
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Natural law is essentially unwritten
law, though portions of it may have been declared legislation. It has always ex-
isted. It is always the same everywhere. Before lez, ius was .... It [is] the "good
old law, not indeed expressly handed down, but tacitly existent," not created but
discovered.
Id. at 98 (footnotes omitted).
55. 402 So. 2d at 639.
56. See generally Note, supra note 2, at 299.
57. See W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS S 1, at 6 (4th ed. 1971), although this proposition
needs little support.
58. See text at note 19, supra.
59. LA. CirV. CODE art. 2315, which provides in part, "Every act whatever of man that
causes damage to another obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair it."
60. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2315, which provides in part,
The right to recover all other damages caused by an offense or quasi offense,
if the injured person dies, shall survive for a period of one year from the death
of the deceased in favor of: . . . [three classes of wrongful death beneficiaries].
... The survivors in whose favor this right of action survives may also recover
the damages which they sustained through the wrongful death of the deceased.
(Emphasis added).
61. 402 So. 2d at 639.
62. Id. at 638.
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the defendants' position as an attempt to preclude recovery by argu-
ing "that the third paragraph of [article) 2315, authorizing recovery
for damages (other than property damages). .. contemplates damages
for the wrongful death of a person."" Because article 28 considers
an unborn as never having been conceived, the defendants claimed
that article 28 "precludes recovery for the wrongful death of a child
born dead, even if damages were otherwise recoverable under [article]
2315."'
Justice Lemmon characterized the defendants' argument as im-
plying that the loss of an unborn child is a damage, other than a prop-
erty damage, only recoverable under the wrongful death action. But
because the wrongful death action requires the death of a "person,"
the application of article 28 would preclude recovery because a child
born dead, considered as never having been conceived, is not a legal
person. The defendants then further argued that this item of damages
cannot be recovered even under the first paragraph because this
damage cannot be recovered in wrongful death. Viewed in this light,
the defendants' argument seems to imply that the wrongful death ac-
tion prohibits the recovery of damages "otherwise recoverable" under
the first paragraph. Under this analysis, the court, in rejecting the
defendants' argument, has taken the case out of wrongful death by
declaring that the legislature did not intend article 28 to preclude
the recovery of such damages.
The problem with this interpretation of the case stems from the
use of the "otherwise recoverable" language. By Act 71 of 1884,5 the
legislature amended article 2315 to provide for a wrongful death ac-
tion. The amendment legislatively overturned, at least for the benefit
of certain enumerated beneficiaries," the rule first articulated in Loui-
siana in the case of Hubgh v. New Orleans and Carrollton Railroad
Co.1 7 that no one may recover damages for injuries arising out of the
injury to or death of another person. " It was because of the narrow
63. Id. at 637.
64. Id.
65. 1884 La. Acts, No. 71, amending LA. Civ. CODE art. 2315.
66. The enumerated beneficiaries in article 2315 are
(1) the surviving spouse and child or children of the deceased, or either such spouse
or such child or children: (2) the surviving father and mother of the deceased,
or either of them, if he left no spouse or child surviving: and (3) the surviving
brothers and sisters of the deceased, or any of them, if he left no spouse. child,
or parent surviving.
67. 6 La. Ann. 495 (1851). For a detailed discussion, see Johnson, Death on the
Callais Coach: The Mystery of Louisiana Wrongful Death and Survival Actions, 37 LA.
L. REV. 1 (1976); Voss, The Recovery of Damages for Wrongful Death at Common Law, at
Civil Law, and in Louisiana, 6 TUL. L. REV. 201 (1932).
68. In Hubgh, the plaintiffs husband was killed by an exploding steam engine boiler.
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judicial construction of article 2315 that the legislature provided the
wrongful death action, the intention of the legislature being to ex-
pand, not contract, tort liability. The fact is that the early Louisiana
jurisprudence determined that the damages now recoverable in a
wrongful death suit were not "otherwise recoverable" under the foun-
tainhead article. The argument that the wrongful death action
precludes an "otherwise recoverable" item of damage is contrary,
therefore, not only to the fundamental nature of the wrongful death
remedy but also to a clearly established jurisprudential rule.
It is perhaps unfortunate that the court framed the issue so am-
biguously. The real issue is whether the damages associated with or
arising out of the loss of an unborn child is an item of damages
recoverable in a wrongful death action or in a first paragraph action.
The difference between the two causes of action, which may have con-
tributed to the confusion, lies in the kind of damages awardable for
the specified injury. Non-pecuniary damages recoverable in wrongful
death usually take the form of compensation for the bereaved's men-
tal anguish over the loss of the loved one."9 If recovery were to be
allowed under the first paragraph, the nature of the damages would
be the same because neither parent would be suing for damages aris-
ing out of his own bodily injury," but from his mental suffering due
to the loss of the child. The subtle but crucial distinction is that the
wrongful death action allows recovery for the mental damage arising
out of the death of another person, whereas a first paragraph action
does not.
The determination, therefore, of whether a wrongful death action
exists for the death of a fetus is an entirely separate question from
the determination of whether a cause of action exists under the "foun-
tainhead article" for the breach of an obligation not to cause parents;
to suffer the loss of their unborn child. In fact, a judicial recognition
of a new cause of action compensable under the first paragraph of
article 2315-such as the loss of prospective parenthood7 -actually
Denial of damages arising out of injuries to another is said to have begun with Black
v. Carrollton R.R., 10 La. Ann. 33 (1855). See also Bertrand v. State Farm Fire & Cas.
Co., 333 So. 2d 322 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1976); Hickman v. Parish of East Baton Rouge,
314 So. 2d 486 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1975), writ denied, 318 So. 2d 59 (La. 1976). For a
criticism of this rule see Stone, Emotional Distress Occasioned by Another's Peril, 48
TUL. L. REv. 782 (1974). See also LA. CiV. CODE art. 1934(3).
69. See Roundtree v. Technical Welding & Fabrication Co., Inc., 364 So. 2d 1325
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1978); Walker v. St. Paul Ins. Co., 339 So. 2d 441 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1976). See also Johnson, supra note 67 at 2.
70. The mother already has a cause of action for these damages. Rogillio v.
Cazedessus, 241 La. 186, 127 So. 2d 734 (1961).
71. This argument has been advanced elsewhere. See Danos v. St. Pierre, 383 So.
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would obviate the problem of wrongful death: The characterization
of the fetus as a "person" would be unnecessary because the cause
of action would not be for wrongful death. Likewise, the recovery
by the parents would be for damages they sustain, not from the death
of a "person," but from the loss of parenthood caused by a "tortfeasor's
fault."7
In light of the foregoing discussion, the more likely interpreta-
tion of the case is that the court grounded recovery in wrongful death,
even though recovery under the first paragraph was an available alter-
native remedy. Language to the effect that birth alone "is without
relevance to a decision ... to recognize a cause of action for wrongful
death"7 makes little sense except in the context of a wrongful death
action. The majority opinion declares that
[tihe loss to the parents . . . is substantially the same, whether
the tortfeasor's fault causes the child to be born dead or to die
shortly after being born alive, and a cause of action for the loss
should be recognized in either event, at least in the absence of
specific legislation expressing a contrary intent.
Moreover, in his opinion on original hearing and in his dissent on
rehearingi Chief Justice Dixon expressly framed the issue as one for
the wrongful death of a fetus. 5 In addition, judges at the appellate
level"8 and Justice Dennis in his concurring opinion on rehearing"
viewed the case as one for the wrongful death of a fetus.
Unfortunately, in granting the wrongful death action, the court
did not address the issue of the unborn child's personality-not only
as a general proposition in the Civil Code 8 but also in relation to
the express wording of article 2315.11 Under a broad reading of the
decision, the court may have restricted the effects of legal person-
2d 1019, 1024 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1980) (Ellis, J., concurring): Note, Torts-Prenatal In-
juries, 20 LA. L. REV. supra note 17, at 810.
72. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2315, para. 1.
73. 402 So. 2d at 638 n. 5.
74. Id. at 638.
75. Id. at 634, 639 (Dixon, C.J., on original hearing and in dissent on rehearing).
76. Danos v. St. Pierre, 383 So. 2d 1019, 1024 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1980) (Lottinger,
J., concurring).
77. 402 So. 2d at 639,. Justice Dennis joined the court's opinion fully but also con-
curred for the reasons given by Judge Lottinger in his concurring opinion for the
court of appeals.
78. See text at notes 30-36, supra. Both articles 28 and 29 are placed in Book
I, Title I of the Civil Code, which provides a general treatment of the distinctions
of persons.
79. See note 60, supra.
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ality, insofar as it defines the capability of acquiring rights,8 0 to in-
heritance matters only." If more narrowly read, the opinion may in-
dicate that personality is unnecessary only for purposes of wrongful
death recovery. The court did not articulate clearly which reading
is correct.
If the former reading is the correct one-that is, that lack of legal
personality affects only inheritance rights-then the court's rationale
warrants closer examination in relation to the survival action in arti-
cle 2315.1 When one who has been tortiously injured dies, for whatever
reason, before his cause of action against the tortfeasor has prescribed,
a right of action to sue for the victim's damages passes on to certain
enumerated beneficiaries." Thus, if a stillborn acquires a cause of ac-
tion for his prenatal injuries, due to the effects of legal personality,
then his parents acquire the right to sue for those same injuries as
survivors of the stillborn child.
If the latter reading is correct-that wrongful death recovery
alone is unaffected by the unborn's lack of legal personality -then the
court's rationale is not completely consonant with earlier Louisiana
prenatal cases. Cooper v. Blanck" broadly construed article 29 to grant
a cause of action for prenatal injuries either to the child or to his
survivors if the child should subsequently die."5 The court in the ins-
tant case, however, refused to apply article 28-a statute in pari
materia with article 29 T -to articulate 2315 because of a perceived
lack of legislative intent. In fact, no mention was made of article 29.
80. S. LITVINOFF & W. T9TE, LOUISIANA TRANSACTIONS: THE CIVIL LAW OF JURIDICAL
ACTS, S 7 at 2 (1969). See also Gordon, supra note 2, in which the author states, "Law
requires some definite clear-cut lines, particularly one which heralds the beginning
of legal personality. It is inaccurate to characterize the law. of status as arbitrary,
if that word is ever to have any meaningful content." Id. at 593.
81. "The fact [of birth] may well have importance in inheritance matters, but is
without relevance to a decision of whether or not to recognize a cause of action for
wrongful death." 402 So. 2d at 638 n.5.
82. See notes 60 & 66, supra.
83. In Guidry v. Theriot, 377 So. 2d 319 (La. 1979), the Louisiana Supreme Court
held that article 2315 grants to the enumerated beneficiaries two separate and distinct
causes of action. The survival action allows the beneficiaries the right to recover the
damages the victim suffered and would have been entitled to recover had he lived.
The wrongf-d death action allows the same beneficiaries the right to recover for the
damages they have sustained as a result of the victim's wrongful death. For further
discussion, see Johnson, Death on the Callais Coach, supra note 67; Comment, Survival
of Actions in Article 2315 of the Louisiana Civil Code: The Victim's Action and the
Wrongful Death Action, 43 TUL. L. REV. 330 (1966); Comment, Rights of Children to an
Action for Wrongful Death Under Article 2315, 14 TUL. L. REV. 612 (1940).
84. 39 So. 2d 352 (Orl. App. 1923) (unreported until 1949).
85. See text at notes 31-33, supra.
86. See text at note 76, supra.
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How the one article can be applicable when the other is not in
unclear." If article 29 does not apply to article 2315 tort liability, then
the court must re-evaluate the basis of recovery for prenatal injuries
when the child lives. If article 29 does apply, then the court's rationale
in the instant case is inconsistent with that of Cooper v. Blanck."
A third, less obvious interpretation of the case is that the court,
through the use of the principles of article 21 of the Louisiana Civil
Code, has created a narrow exception to the requirement that a child
be born alive before the effects of personality may accrue. Article
21 provides that "in all cases where there is no express law, the judge
is bound to proceed and decide according to equity. To decide
equitably, an appeal is to be made to natural law and reason, and
received usages, where positive law is silent."8 The court specifically
based its decision on a "logical resolution of a problem in which the
Legislature has not specifically expressed its intent to authorize or
prohibit such recovery."" According to article 21, this lack of
legislative intent would be equivalent to an absence of express law,
thereby authorizing a resort to equity. In its conclusion, the court
declared that the arguments "favoring recovery more fully satisfy the
87. Article 29 was adopted in its present form from the Projet of the Code of
1825 and has remained unchanged for 157 years. Whatever intention the legislature
had in enacting article 28, also adopted from the Projet, must have been the same
for article 29. See 1972 COMPILED EDITIONS OF THE CIVIL CODE OF LOUISIANA arts. 28 &
29 (J. Dainow ed.). Professor Stone has argued the amendment to article 2315 by Act
71 of 1884 also amended article 28 in order to provide for wrongful death recovery
for fetuses. F. STONE, TORT DOCTRINE, in 12 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE S 63 (1977).
The court, however, rejected this argument, again on the basis of an absence of
legislative intent. 402 So. 2d at 638 n.3. But see Deason v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 386 So. 2d 146 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1980) (following Professor Stone's argument).
88. 39 So. 2d 352. In a footnote, the court stated that "the fact [that a child is
stillborn] may well have importance in inheritance matters, but it is without relevance
to a decision of whether or not to recognize a cause of action for wrongful death."
402 So. 2d at 638 n.5. Arguably, then, birth is irrelevant also to the survival action,
a tort action not dependent on inheritance.
On original hearing, and in dissent on rehearing, Chief Justice Dixon argued that
a cause of action is a property right that arises through the operation of law. 402
So. 2d at 623, 639, (citing LA. CIV. CODE art. 870.) Ownership of property and rights in
property are limited to natural or judicial persons. LA. Civ. CODE art. 479. Thus, in order
for a fetus to own a cause of action for its own injuries, it must be a "person." A
fetus cannot acquire property through inheritance unless he is born alive, though he
may die later. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 954-957. But the Code articles defining capacity for
inheritance do not apply to property rights acquired through operation of law. The
only other articles discussing the fetus' personality are articles 28 and 29, which ac-
cording to the court's ratihonale in the instant.case, cannot apply to tort. An unborn
child, then, cannot sue for its prenatal injuries; hence, the inconsistency.
89. LA. Civ. CODE art. 21.
90. 402 So. 2d at 638.
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logical reasoning and application of the natural law."'" This language
is a close parallel to article 21's definition of equity. Although the
court made no specific reference to article 21 in the decision, such
language perhaps indicates at least an implicit reliance on equity."
Under this analysis, although article 28 determines when legal per-
sonality commences in general, it has no specific application to an ac-
tion for the wrongful death of a fetus. Being therefore faced with
a situation in which the legislature has offered little guidance and
in order to effectuate public policy, the court has declared that an
action for the wrongful death of a "person" includes an action for the
wrongful death of a fetus.
Whether the specific theory of recovery derives from the first.
paragraph of article 2315, from wrongful death, or from equity, as
a matter of legislative interpretation, the court in the instant case
may have inappropriately and even unnecessarily restricted the ap-
plication of article 28 (and arguably article 29 as well). A court may
legitimately construe a statute, "when its expressions are dubious,"
with reference to legislative intent. 3 However, "when a law is clear
and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded,
under the pretext of pursuing its spirit." Further, "laws in pari
materia . . . must be construed with a reference to each other."'"
Finally, a court may not distinguish between odious or favorable laws
"with a view of narrowing or extending their construction."" The ap-
plication of article 28 may or may not be deleterious to wrongful death
recovery, depending on its construction with other articles in pari
materia. However, the wording is both express and clear. Thus, the
court's reliance upon the absence of the legislative intent to apply
article 28 to wrongful death actions to support the conclusion that
the Civil Code neither expressly nor impliedly denies recovery is at
91. Id. at 639.
92. For a general discussion of equity in Louisiana see Barham, Methodology. of
Civil Law in Louisiana, 50 TUL. L. REV. 474 (1976); Sanders, The Judge: The Extent and
Limit of his Role in a Civil Law Jurisdiction, 50 TUL. L. REV. 511 (1976); Stone, The
So-Called Unprovided For Case, 53 TUL. L. REV. 93 (1978). See also Stone, Tort Doctrine
in Louisiana: The Concept of Fault, 27 TUL. L. REV. 1 (1952), wherein the author states,
"It is fair to say that the development of the Louisiana law of delictual responsibility
in its formative period came principally through the use of article 21 .... This is
not to say that all early judges, in their decisions on matters where the positive law
was silent, made specific reference to Article 21. Only a few of them did." Id. at 5
(footnotes omitted).
93. LA. CIV. CODE art. 18.
94. LA. CiV. CODE art. 13.
95. LA. CiV. CODE art. 17.
96. LA. CIv. CODE art, 20.
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least questionable." On the other hand, as a matter of social policy,
a "judge's sense of justice sometimes requires him ... to improvise
a new solution beyond any implied or authorized legislation.""
Perhaps a better disposition of the case is found in a broad con-
struction of article 29, as made by the Orleans Court of Appeals in
Cooper v. Blanck." In referring to the amendment of article 29 in
1825,'" the court noted that "the words of limitation found in the
original text of the article have been omitted and that since the adop-
tion of the code of 1825, children en ventra sa mere are considered
born 'in whatever relates to themselves.' This language used is of
the most sweeping character.'"" Dismissing the argument that arti-
cle 29 applied only to succession matters, the court further noted that
"the use of an illustration concerning property rights . . . would
naturally be the most frequent application of the principle and conse-
quently would most readily occur to the minds of the author."'" A
97. See text at note 52, supra.
98. Tate, The "New Judicial Solution": Occasions for and Limits to Judicial Creativ-
ity, 54 TUL. L. REv. 877, 913 (1980). He explains further:
In abstract theory, I cannot easily justify this sort of judicial activism....
[Hjowever. I can perhaps explain its occurrence, even among judges with strong
feelings of fidelity to legislative supremacy in policy-choice; the judge with an
oath to serve justice under the law, is confronted with an unfair result or a socially
unworkable rule that he does not believe the legislature would have intended.
had it foreseen the particular factual or social circumstances before the court.
Id. at 913.
99. 39 So. 2d 352.
100. LA. CiV. CODE art. 7 (1808), amended without comment by the redactors of the
Civil Code of 1825, provided:
Children in their mother's womb, cannot be reckoned among the number of children,
not even for the purposes of imparting to the father, the rights and advantages which
the law may grant to parents on account of the number of their children.
Yet the hope that such children may be born alive, causes them to be con-
sidered in whatever relates to themselves, as if they were already born; thus
the inheritances which fall to them, before their birth, and which belong to them,
are kept for them, and curators are assigned to take care of their estates for
their benefit.
(Emphasis added). See 1972 COMPILED EDITIONS OF THE CIVIL CODE OF LOUISIANA art. 29
(J. Dainow ed.).
101. 39 So. 2d at 360.
102. Id. Articles 28 and 29 originate from LAS SIETE PARTIDAS. a codification of
Spanish law from the late middle ages. The history of article 28 in Judge Lottinger's
concurring opinion in the appellate decision of the instant case is used to illustrate
that Spanish law meant to apply that article only to inheritence matters. 383 So. 2d
at 1024. The source of article 29 is cited in a footnote with no discussion of the cor-
responding language used in the Spanish Code. 383 So. 2d at 1025 n.4. The source
of article 29 provides in part, "While a child is unborn it will profit by everything
which is done or said for its advantage, just as if it were born, but whatever is said
or done to the injury of its person or property will be of no effect." LAS SIETA PAR.
TIDAS bk. 4, tit. 23, 1. 3 (Scott trans. 1931) (emphasis added). The amendment of article
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broad construction of article 29 would modify article 28 to the extent
that an unborn child is a "person" for all matters that relate to it,
while leaving intact the requirement of live birth for inheritance
rights."'3
Moreover, this construction logically extends tort coverage to in-
clude a survival action for the unborn child's injuries. If an unborn
child can be deemed already born for purposes of the wrongful death
action, which compensates the survivors for their own injuries, caused
by the death of the fetus, then, a fortiori, the unborn child should
be deemed already born for purposes of a survival suit based upon
a tortfeasor's interference with the fetus' right to life.'"
A separate question, though stemming from the analysis of the
court's theory of recovery, concerns the extent of the precise holding
of the case. First, viability should not be a requirement for recovery.
The court relied upon the recent criminal code amendment defining
a person as a human being from the moment of conception as
legislative support for granting recovery. Moreover, although at com-
mon law all but one of the states allowing recovery for the wrongful
death of a fetus still adhere to the viability limitation, the viability
requirement is no longer consistent with established medical
authority."5 Further, prior Louisiana decisions of prenatal cases, im-
29 in 1825 appears to have brought that article more in line with its Spanish origin
and further supports the argument that article 29 is to be applied generally throughout
the Code.
103. The requirement of live birth is handled specifically by articles 954-957 of
the Civil Code; no violence would be done to those provisions. Such a construction
also would supply a better theoretical justification for a denial of a father's suit for
his unborn child's wrongful death action for the death of its mother, which right the
fetus would acquire under article 29 but would be unable to transmit to his heirs
due to articles 954-957. See Diefenderfer v. La. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 383 So.
2d 1032 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1980) (the fetus outlived its mother by a few minutes in
the womb, but the fetus' wrongful death suit was denied).
104. A survival suit for a stillborn would be no more of a windfall to the survivors
than would a survival suit for a child who lives only a few minutes outside the womb.
See Cooper v. Blanck, 39 So. 2d 353. Moreover, by the court's own argument in the
instant case, difficulty of the proof of damages or possibility of fraudulent claims should
not bar a valid claim. See text at note 53, supra.
105. Porter v. Lassiter, 91 Ga. App. 712, 87 S.E.2d 100 (1955) (injury was to a two
and one-half month old fetus). Rejection of the Dietrich-Allair rationale that an un-
born is a part of its mother until birth was predicated on the recognition that medical
authority regarded a viable fetus as a separate entity. Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp.
138 (D.D.C. 1946). Now that medical authority recognizes the biological independence
of the fetus from the moment of conception, there seems to be little justification for
maintaining the viability requirement. See generally Note, Prenatal Injuries, 18 VAND.
L. REV. supra note 28; Note, supra note 2; Note, supra note 14. But'see Gordon, supra
note 2; Comment, Developments in the Law of Prenatal Wrongful Death, 69 DICK. L.
REV. 258 (1965).
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plicitly affirmed by the instant case, involved pre-viable, unborn
children.'" Second, if the action granted is one for wrongful death,
then recovery should not be restricted to the parents.' 2 The same
considerations favoring recovery for the parents' loss apply equally
to the compensation of any surviving siblings."°'
Finally, some mention should be made of the ramifications of Roe
v. Wade'" and a women's constitutional right to an abortion upon the
result of decisions like the instant case. An anomaly exists in the treat-
ment of the fetus as a person by the state for purposes of tort
recovery and in the holding in Roe that a fetus is not a "person" within
the meaning of the fourteenth amendment to the United States
Constitution."' The apparent conflict between the two interests is
sharply illustrated in a situation where a husband seeks to sue for
the wrongful death of his aborted child."' Unfortunately, the courts
have no clear guidance for a proper resolution of the issue.,
106. See Stewart v. Arkansas Southern R.R. Co., 112 La. 764, 36 So. 676 (1904)
(mother was two and one-half months pregnant at time of injury); Ezell v. Morrison,
380 So. 2d 664 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1980) (mother four and one-half months pregnant);
Valence v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 50 So. 2d 847 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1951). The
appellate decision of the instant case specifically rejected "viability as a controlling
factor." 383 So. 2d at 1029 (Lottinger, J., concurring). Presumably, the parents of Louise
Brown could sue in products liability in Louisiana for the wrongful death of their child
caused by a defective test tube.
107. See text at note 66, supra. Since a fetus can neither marry nor bear offspring,
the only applicable class of beneficiaries would be parents and siblings.
108. The point is illustrated in the case of a young teenager, an only child, whose
expectations of a brother or sister are dashed when his father and pregnant mother
are tragically killed in an automobile accident.
109. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The woman's right to an abortion is subsumed in the
woman's fundamental right to privacy. Id. at 152-156.
110. Id. at 161-62.
111. See Legislative Symposium: Torts, 37 LA. L. REv. 1. 118 n.34 (1976), where the
question is raised in connection with a spouse's right to sue his spouse's liability in-
surer, and in connection with a father's right to sue for the wrongful death of his
illegitimate. See also Note. The Law and the Unborn Child: The Legal and Logical In-
consistencies, 46 NOTRE DAME LAw. 349 (1971), wherein the author queries:
Will the pregnant woman who is hit by a negligent driver while she is on her
way to the hospital to have an abortion still have a cause of action for the wrongful
death of her unborn child? If so, how is it possible for the law to say that a
child can be wrongfully killed only hours before he can be rightfully killed?
Id. at 369.
112. One author suggests that the apparent conflict of the two interests is
"superficial":
Assuming that the woman's right to terminate her pregnancy is but an aspect
of her overall right to determine the outcome of her pregnancy, she would also
have a constitutionally protected right to continue the pregnancy to delivery free
from state interference not necessary to further its compelling interests in pro-
tecting the health and life of the woman and in protectiqg the potentiality of
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However, a similar anomaly does not exist with regard to the
viability issue. According to Roe v. Wade, though a fetus may repre-
sent only the "potentiality of life,""' viability only marks the point
at which the state's interest in protecting matei'nal and fetal life
becomes compelling enough to justify interference with a woman's
fundamental right to an abortion. 1' Viability does not under Roe mark
the beginning of legal personality. On that basis, Roe v. Wade is
distinguishable from a decision to allow recovery for the wrongful
death of a non-viable fetus where the personality of the fetus-depends
upon biological independence.1
From the standpoint of social policy, the decision in Danos v. St.
Pierre achieves a just solution, although the theory of recovery has
raised certain questions that undoubtedly will necessitate future
judicial explanation. Nevertheless, compensation for the loss of one's
unborn, in many cases, "marks the difference between a happy,
peaceful and contented existence and a leaden footed march through
life's pathway,""' and for that the court is to be applauded.
Joseph McReynolds
life represented by the unborn. While the Constitution would not prohibit purely
private interference with the woman's right to continue her pregnancy to term,
it also would not, under Roe v. Wade's reasoning, prohibit a state from protecting
that right by recognizing and enforcing money judgments for harm caused by
interference with the woman's right. Thus, at least in the context of the wrongful
death action, which generally benefits the parents of the deceased child, recogni-
tion of a right to sue for the death of the fetus-both before and after birth-
would have the effect of protecting the woman's constitutionally protected right
to continue her pregnancy to term.
Kader, supra note 2, at 664-65.
113. 410 U.S. at 162.
114. Id. at 163.
115. See text at notes 20 & 104, supra. See Kader, supra note 2, at 659-60:
The viability or nonviability of the fetus may be determinative if the question
is the woman's right to terminate its existence in the exercise of her individual
right to privacy. But it is 'certainly not determinative, or even relevant, if the
question is the ability of the tortfeasor to escape liability for his acts.
But see Toth v. Goree, 65 Mich. App. 296, 237 N.W.2d 297 (1975):
If the mother can intentionally terminate the pregnancy at three months without
regard to the rights of the fetus, it becomes increasingly difficult to justify holding
a third person liable to the fetus for unknowingly and unintentionally, but negli-
gently. causing the pregnancy to end at that same stage. There would be an in-
herent conflict in giving the mother the right to terminate the pregnancy yet
holding that an action may be brought on behalf of the same fetus under the
wrongful death act.
65 Mich. App. at 303-04, 237 N.W.2d at 301 (footnotes omitted).
116. Cooper v. Blanck, 39 So. 2d 353, 361. (Orl App. 1923) (unreported until 1949).
